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AGENDA
Anforderungen
Umsetzung
Prototyp
Evaluation
MOTIVATION
PROPOSED SOLUTION
EVALUATION
Classical Offline Benchmarking
Complex methodology for identification of best practices 
within an industry by in-depth comparison of various players.
Participants give up some privacy for a greater good: 
specialised (trusted) consultants learn internal details.
Benchmarking projects are often expensive and cumbersome.
Objective: Develop an Online Platform 
for Quantitative Benchmarking of KPIs
Addresses only a sub-problem:
enable users to compare numeric metrics with their
peers without disclosing their own values
Objective: Develop an Online Platform 
for Quantitative Benchmarking of KPIs
Addresses only a sub-problem:
enable users to compare numeric metrics with their
peers without disclosing their own values
We will only show how to compute the sum of KPI values.
Main Contributions:
1) platform protects identity of participants
2) user-driven peer group formation
3) support for SMC protocols with differing
    communication models
Application Area: Financial Sector
Compare business-critical metrics with competitors,
e. g. proportion of subprimes in credit portfolio 
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Is this too much?
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Comparison makes only 
sense for peer groups with 
a well-known profile!
Requirements
FUNCTIONALITY SECURITY USABILITY
• Users can request a new 
benchmarking at any time.
• Users can specify the peer group 
requirements for new benchmarkings.
• Users can view a listing of available 
benchmarking requests.
• Users can opt to (not) take part in 
announced benchmarkings.
• Support for various statistics
Requirements
SECURITYFUNCTIONALITY USABILITY
• Users are anonymous against platform 
provider and other users.
• Benchmarked KPI values are not 
disclosed to provider and other users.
• Requested peer group formation is 
enforced by platform.
Requirements
USABILITYFUNCTIONALITY SECURITY
• Platform is built on off-the-shelf 
technologies.
• Communication protocol is client-
driven (polling).
• Benchmarking results are available 
within short time.
• Platform offers satisfactory 
performance for reasonable loads.
Related Research
Bogetoft et al. (2002)  Internet Based Benchmarking
Crotts et al. (2006)  A Case Study on Developing an Internet-
      Based Competitive Analysis and Benchmarking 
      Tool for Hospitality Industry
Kerschbaum et al. (2008) Privacy-Preserving Benchmarking
Catrina et al. (2008)  Fostering the Uptake of Secure Multiparty
      Computation in E-Commerce
Identified important building blocks, but no platform
available that meets our requirements.
Research Questions
How to combine existing building block technologies 
to address our requirements?
Will the performance of the benchmarking platform 
be acceptable? 
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Have to Address Three Main Issues 
Protect benchmarked KPI values 
Protect privacy of users
Allow for user-driven peer group formation
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Physical Architecture:
Client/Server
U  Users
SP  Platform Service Provider
CA Certification Authority
Architecture
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Architecture
end-to-end encryption 
allows for P2P messages
Some SMC protocols assume 
P2P architecture!
Activities of Involved Parties
Users
register at platform
request a new benchmarking
participate in published benchmarkings
SP
publishes benchmarkings and results on a bulletin
relays messages for users
CA
checks users’ identity and selection attributes
issues certificates for users 
Attacker Model
Users
honest but curious
may collude or cooperate with SP
try to learn KPI values and identity of other users
SP
honest but curious
tries to learn KPI values and identity of other users
CA
trusted, does not attack
does not cooperate with SP and users
Possible extensions:  truth-telling, free-riding, active attacks, ...
User-Driven Peer Group Formation
Users provide Selection Attributes 
during registration at CA:
REGISTRATION
Identity:
TrustBank & Company
Selection Attributes:
Location: Germany
No. of employees: 200
Business area: financial services
BENCHMARKING REQUEST
Benchmarked KPI: 
proportion of subprimes
Selection Criteria:
Location = Germany
No. of employees < 500
Business area=financial services
User specifies required Selection 
Criteria for benchmark initiation:
Platform will allow only users with matching attributes to participate.
Protecting Privacy of Users
Only (trusted) CA knows real identity of users, SP does not.
Users are addressed with pseudonyms (public-key certificates) that 
do not contain any identifying information.
Selection Attributes may reveal identity, thus must not be disclosed 
to platform provider or other users.
Anonymity of users still at risk:
users must hide their IP address from SP!
Protection Against Intersection Attacks
INTERSECTION ATTACK
RECIPE
Cannot use static pseudonyms due to intersection attacks!
1. Set up a benchmarking and 
record the set of participating 
pseudonyms
2. Vary selection criteria slightly
3. Go back to step 1
Intersect and compare sets to 
deduce actual selection attribute 
values of various pseudonyms.
Protection Against Intersection Attacks
INTERSECTION ATTACK
RECIPE
Cannot use static pseudonyms due to intersection attacks!
1. Set up a benchmarking and 
record the set of participating 
pseudonyms
2. Vary selection criteria slightly
3. Go back to step 1
Intersect and compare sets to 
deduce actual selection attribute 
values of various pseudonyms.
Solution:
Never re-use a pseudonym!
Clients create ephemeral key-pairs 
for each new benchmarking and 
for each participation.
Phase 1
Register at CAPeer Group Formation
create permanent
key pair
Selection Attributes
verify identity and correctness 
of Selection Attributes
sign Permanent Public Key
create Attribute Certificate
P
CAUser

Phase 2
New BenchmarkingPeer Group Formation
create ephemeral
key pair
authenticate user
sign Ephemeral Public Key
E
authenticate with
Permanent Key Pair
User CA
Phase 2 (cont.)
New BenchmarkingPeer Group Formation
send
Benchmarking Request
KPI (proportion of subprimes)
deadline (60 minutes)
Selection Criteria
(Germany,
financial services,
1000-10.000 employees)
check signature
publish benchmarking
wait for participants to join
User SP

Selection Criteria
Phase 3
ParticipationPeer Group Formation
create ephemeral
key pair
authenticate user
iff presented Attribute Certificate 
matches Selection Criteria:
sign Ephemeral Public Key
issue Participation Certificate
E
authenticate
Attribute
Certificate
User CA
Phase 3 (cont.)
ParticipationPeer Group Formation
send
Participation Certificate
iff presented Selection Critera 
match the ones of the 
benchmarking and certificate 
is valid:
accept client and add 
Ephemeral Public Key to
List of Participants
once deadline is reached: 
publish List of Participants
User SP

Protection of Benchmarked KPI Values
SumSecureSplit SumHomomorphic
Robust Summation (Atallah, 2004)
P2P communication topology
O(n²) message exchanges
Low computational complexity
Paillier cryptosystem (1999)
with additive homomorphic 
property:   E(x) ⠂E(y) = E(x + y)
Client/server topology
O(n) message exchanges
High computational complexity
More SMC algorithms to be integrated in future work.
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Prototypical Implementation
Implementation in Java SE 5
All connections encrypted with TLS
Hybrid encryption of P2P messages
Proprietary XML message format
Client can be automated for evaluation
SumSecureSplit SumHomomorphic
SumHomomorphic induces less traffic
Total server-side traffic of one benchmarking 
for varying number of participants
SumHomomorphic induces less load
Average CPU load of server components
for varying number of participants
SumSecureSplit SumHomomorphic
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Our platform facilitates quantitative benchmarking
with user-controlled peer group formation. 
It offers practical anonymity and unlinkability to its users.
Performance of implemented secure multi-party
computation protocols is sufficient for our purpose.
 
Summation with Paillier crypto system is more efficient
than Robust Summation.
In Conclusion
